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NO. 16 FEBRUARY 2021 Introduction 
Revisiting the EU Cybersecurity Strategy: 
A Call for EU Cyber Diplomacy 
Annegret Bendiek and Matthias C. Kettemann 
In December 2020, the European Union (EU) presented its new strategy on cybersecu-
rity with the aim of strengthening Europe’s technological and digital sovereignty. The 
document lists reform projects that will link cybersecurity more closely with the EU’s 
new rules on data, algorithms, markets, and Internet services. However, it clearly falls 
short of the development of a European cyber diplomacy that is committed to both 
“strategic openness” and the protection of the digital single market. In order to achieve 
this, EU cyber diplomacy should be made more coherent in its supranational, demo-
cratic, and economic/technological dimensions. Germany can make an important con-
tribution to that by providing the necessary legal, technical, and financial resources 
for the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
 
In 2019, the EU registered around 450 attacks 
on critical infrastructures in the energy and 
water supply sectors as well as information 
and communication technologies in the 
health, transport, and finance sectors. The 
vulnerabilities of technologically inter-
dependent societies became particularly 
evident during the Covid-19 pandemic. In 
December, cybercriminals targeted the 
European Medicines Agency. In order to 
preserve its socio-political model, the EU 
must assert itself in a security environment 
that is characterized by mutual threat per-
ceptions and an increasingly dynamic tech-
nological arms race. The director of the 
Technology and National Security Program 
at the Center for a New American Security, 
Paul Scharre, pointed out some time ago 
that the technology race is repeating the 
security dilemma of the nuclear age (Foreign 
Affairs, May/June 2019). How is the EU re-
sponding strategically to the changed global 
political environment? What role can the 
EU play in preventing cyberattacks, for 
example on power plants, in advance? Are 
there crises management structures in place 
at the European level to ensure immediate 
and comprehensive action if necessary? 
EU Cybersecurity Strategy 
Since 2015, the EU has been working on 
its response options to attacks from – and 
conflicts in – the cyber and information 
space (CIS). Some foreign and security 
policy initiatives have been launched in the 
last few years (see SWP Comment 19/2018). 
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Worth mentioning here are, among others, 
the Diplomatic Response Framework (Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox) and the Cyber Defence 
Policy Framework (both 2018); the EU 
Cybersecurity Act and the EU toolbox for 
5G security (both 2019); as well as the EU 
Security Union Strategy and the Screening 
of (Digital) Investment (2020). Since 2020, 
the EU has focused its activities – together 
with the member states – on building 
operational capacity to prevent, deter, and 
respond to serious cyber incidents in Europe. 
The current framework is set by the new 
EU Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital 
Decade, presented in December 2020 by the 
European Commission and the High Repre-
sentative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Josep Borrell. It is closely linked to 
other Union initiatives, such as the Digital 
Single Market Strategy, the Commission’s 
Economic Recovery Plan, and the Security 
Union Strategy 2020–2025. 
The new cybersecurity strategy includes 
the establishment of a “Joint Cyber Unit” 
that will be tasked with strengthening the 
IT capabilities of defense communities in 
the field of cybersecurity and law enforce-
ment agencies in cooperation with civilian 
and diplomatic communities. According 
to the strategy, the EU will also draw on 
the work of the European Defence Agency 
and promote cooperation in the military 
domain of operation, drawing on the newly 
created European Defence Fund. Further-
more, the EU will be given a “cybersecurity 
shield” to identify threats early and take 
countermeasures before damage is done. 
The Commission wants to establish an EU-
wide “network of Security Operations 
Centres across the EU.” It is to serve as a 
cooperation platform for the civilian and 
military authorities of the Union and mem-
ber states that are responsible for cyber-
security and to improve coordination in the 
event of major attacks. To protect critical 
infrastructures, existing EU law and the 
2016 EU Network and Information Security 
Directive (NIS Directive) are to be revised, 
and greater use will be made of artificial 
intelligence to identify cyberattacks against 
hospitals, utilities, and transport networks. 
Since 2018, the EU has had the Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox at its disposal to counter 
serious cyberattacks (see SWP Comment 
19/2018). It has thus designed its own sanc-
tions regime against IT attacks that was 
deployed in July 2020 in the course of the 
technical and legal handling of the 2015 
hacker attacks on the German parliament. 
To implement the cybersecurity strategy, 
proposals will be made under the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to expand 
the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox to effec-
tively counter attacks on critical infrastruc-
ture, supply chains, and democratic institu-
tions and processes. 
Although the cybersecurity strategy 
refers to EU initiatives such as those to com-
bat hybrid threats, the European Democracy 
Action Plan, as well as EU emergency and 
crisis management, the deepening of con-
fidence- and security-building measures of 
EU cyber diplomacy toward third countries 
remains largely underexplored. The need 
for such actions has been noted, but no 
concrete examples or institutional venues 
to implement them have been provided. 
The cybersecurity strategy thus expresses a 
one-sided understanding of security policy 
that shows little awareness of the fact that 
technical and technocratic actions must be 
accompanied by diplomacy. 
Desideratum Cyber Diplomacy 
The one-sidedness of the EU cybersecurity 
strategy is a problem because international 
norm-building is a key element for trust 
and security in the cyber and information 
space. The EEAS needs to be empowered for 
this very task of cyber diplomacy by align-
ing its mandate accordingly. The current 
strategy neglects the important lesson of 
the nuclear age, namely that disarmament 
and trust-building actions lead to generally 
enhanced security. Political scientist Joseph 
S. Nye, for example, argues that, contrary to 
popular belief, deterrence in cyberspace 
can work. He is convinced that the develop-
ment of international norms, which has so 
far been very limited, can have a positive 
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effect on security in the CIS. For this, he 
said, it is essential not to limit the principle 
of deterrence to classic territorial defense 
and immediate retaliation. Rather, cost-
benefit analyses of unintended consequen-
tial costs would deter potential intruders 
from launching attacks. 
The fact that a “cyberwar” has not yet 
taken place could be indicative of the effec-
tiveness of this strategy. International norm 
processes can also dissuade state actors 
from attacking critical infrastructure. 
The norms for responsible state behavior 
in cyberspace, developed by the United 
Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Ex-
perts, prohibit attacks against critical 
infrastructure. The UN General Assembly 
negotiations demonstrate that, despite 
political differences, work is underway on 
common norms for lawful state behavior 
and due diligence in cyberspace. Under the 
Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, the Horizontal 
Working Party on Cyber Issues is tasked 
with these matters; however, so far it has 
only had a coordinating and not a shaping 
role in EU cyber diplomacy due to lacking 
EU supranational competence. 
Furthermore, there is still little consen-
sus on standards for responding to cyber 
actions below the thresholds relevant under 
international law (retorsion); for the approval 
of hardware and software; for dealing with 
supply chain dependencies; and for vulner-
ability management. The November 19, 
2020 “non-paper” by Germany and five 
other EU member states also remains un-
clear with regard to concrete actions. The 
dangers posed by proxies, i.e., non-state 
actors acting on behalf of the state, reduce 
the effectiveness of trust- and security-build-
ing actions. The Council of Europe’s Buda-
pest Convention is to be revised accordingly 
in order to take more effective action against 
non-state cybercrime with a second supple-
mentary protocol. Another source of danger 
that should not be underestimated is the 
high number of low-threshold attacks, for 
example against small and medium-sized 
enterprises. It still needs to be clarified 
what counts as a critical IT security incident 
that must be reported, including to partner 
states outside Europe: Is it when the attackers 
penetrate the network and disrupt it, or 
already when they scan the infrastructure 
of a potential critical infrastructure facility 
and try to find weak points? 
The cybersecurity strategy also mentions 
jointly coordinated NATO-EU situational 
awareness in the CIS, but it remains un-
specific about its implementation. The 
potential of the Helsinki-based European 
Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid 
Threats to build “legal resilience” in rela-
tion to state interference is equally under-
utilized in EU-NATO cooperation. Some 
governments advocate active countermeas-
ures, along the lines of the United States 
demonstrating its supremacy in cyberspace. 
Others, however, argue for the development 
of a consensual frame of reference that 
assigns accountability to states according to 
their resilience measures to prevent conflict 
escalation in the CIS. The EU strategy seeks 
to integrate both approaches more effec-
tively than in the past. In order to realize 
this ambition, the EEAS must be given a 
stronger mandate in the future in terms of 
personnel, funding, and legal competence. 
Digital sovereignty and resilience can 
only be achieved as a pan-European and 
pan-societal task that includes close coordi-
nation at the EU level as well as with demo-
cratic partners; moreover, economic policy 
and technological expertise must be explic-
itly included. This means that EU cyber 
diplomacy must set the framework for this, 
as the CIS is not bound by the competencies 
or borders of individual countries. Public 
institutions, business, the scientific com-
munity, and civil society must work hand 
in hand much more intensively at the Euro-
pean level than they have to date. The 
establishment of a European Cybersecurity 
Industrial, Technology and Research Com-
petence Centre and a network of national 
coordination centres are a first good step. 
Cyber diplomacy can create the supra-
national, democratic, economic, and tech-
nological conditions, both internally and 
externally, to provide the necessary infra-
structure, know-how, and cutting-edge tech-
nology. 
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The Supranational Dimension 
Sectorally conceived policy silos – in 
which the digital dimensions of foreign, 
defense, and domestic policy are developed 
in parallel – are notoriously ill-suited to 
cybersecurity. On the other hand, it makes 
sense for the EU Commission to support the 
interlocking of internal market regulations, 
the fight against cybercrime, the CFSP, and 
the Common Security and Defence Policy, 
as well as initiatives of the Permanent 
Structured Cooperation. An annual imple-
mentation report, modeled after the pro-
gress reports on the implementation of the 
Security Union Strategy, would be bene-
ficial and should give more attention to 
aspects that have been neglected so far, 
such as technical intelligence and infor-
mation exchange. 
In particular, it should systematically 
cover: the preparation and use of cyber-
attacks; the manipulation and sabotage of 
business, financial, and industrial markets; 
the increasing vulnerability of critical infra-
structure; and the growing threat to the 
reliability of traditional defense systems 
from military hackers. Although the new 
Strategic Compass is intended to facilitate 
common EU situational awareness, this 
will require that internal and external cyber-
security agencies prepare to pool their intel-
ligence in the EEAS when needed. Situa-
tional awareness should be underpinned by 
a “horizon scanning” facility, at least as a 
first step. Artificial intelligence should help 
establish early crisis detection. 
This should be followed up by the devel-
opment of an attribution procedure in the 
CFSP decision-making process. To date, 
there are no common standards for clearly 
identifying the perpetrator of a cyberattack. 
The Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic 
Response to Malicious Cyber Activities in-
dicates that member states may use differ-
ent methods and procedures for attributing 
malicious cyber activities, as well as employ 
“different methods and procedures to estab-
lish a degree of certainty on attributing a 
malicious cyber activity.” However, the 
methods, procedures, definitions, and cri-
teria of the member states are not to be 
harmonized, as attribution is to remain 
a sovereign act. The EEAS, with its Intelli-
gence and Analysis Centre, would have to 
be provided new personnel and technical 
competencies if it is to (be able to) publicly 
state who is responsible for cyber incidents; 
this would be of particular importance for 
countering hybrid threats, which also in-
clude disinformation. Measures under the 
Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox do not require 
legally secured attribution in every case. 
Rather, they aim to defend against cyber 
incidents using political-communicative 
and technical means. It should be possible 
to tailor the use of resources, depending 
on the conflict situation. 
In addition, it should be considered 
how the actions envisaged in the toolbox 
can be deployed in the event of a failure 
of key infrastructures in such a way that 
the ability to command, act, and function is 
maintained. Horizontal and vertical cyber-
security cooperation between the EEAS and 
the Commission on the one hand, and be-
tween the EU and the member states on the 
other, is key for the resilience of the ICT 
structures. This crisis management exists 
only as a blueprint and must be under-
pinned by the member states in terms of 
personnel, funding, and competencies. 
The EU member states should recognize 
that digitalization challenges classic diplo-
macy at the national level, to the extent 
that the foreign policy role of the EU Com-
mission changes in the course of imple-
menting the European Digital Strategy: Its 
role is gaining more weight in cyber diplo-
macy. It is the Commission that urges mem-
ber states to be vigilant about attempts to 
divide them, both externally and internally. 
This call for vigilance with regard to foreign 
direct investments or the acquisition of stra-
tegic assets, especially in the digital economy, 
by third countries could take even greater 
account of the risks posed by the volatility 
or undervaluation of European stock mar-
kets. 
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The Democratic Dimension 
Digital foreign policy and cyber diplomacy 
must place more attention than traditional 
foreign and security policies to involving 
non-governmental interest groups and in-
dependent scientists in the policy process 
and to ensuring that the multistakeholder 
approach is applied as broadly as possible. 
To be sure, the practice of multistakeholder 
governance to date has been criticized for 
being misused by large digital corporations 
as an instrument for globalizing their own 
business interests and technical standards. 
However, the decisive integration of all 
societal stakeholders has ultimately proven 
to be a factor that safeguards fundamental 
rights. In particular, a reform of the global 
Internet governance infrastructure is as 
necessary as it is important, whereby the 
“democratic” dimension must be strength-
ened, for example by expanding the role 
of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as 
a global stakeholder meeting, consistently 
involving parliamentary representatives 
in IGF meetings, and including local and 
regional initiatives. Within this framework, 
the EU’s external cyber foreign policy, man-
dated by the member states, will be able to 
continue to work toward ensuring that cen-
tral institutions such as the Internet Corpo-
ration for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) and the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) are geared toward inclusivity 
and participation of all social groups and 
not just toward the interests of business 
(see SWP Research Paper 14/2019). Parlia-
mentary expertise is particularly in demand 
here, as it has been increasingly used in 
recent IGFs. 
The technology-induced uncertainty in 
global politics is clearly reflected at all 
levels in a fundamentally changed percep-
tion of the opportunities and dangers of 
connectivity and interdependence. US 
political scientists Henry Farrell and Abra-
ham L. Newman point out that interde-
pendence is not only a promise but also a 
danger (International Security, July 2019). 
Global networks and supply chains in 
the financial and trading systems, in the 
management of the Internet, and in the 
global communications infrastructure, they 
argue, are highly asymmetric and can be 
used by powerful states as weapons against 
political opponents. The Corona pandemic 
and the assertive posturing of US and Chi-
nese technology companies have given this 
impression more weight. On many issues – 
from access to the global financial and 
monetary system and innovative techno-
logy to needed medicines, digital commu-
nications, and network infrastructure – 
forums, podiums, and supply chains con-
trolled by private actors constitute a source 
of power. States currently find themselves 
overwhelmed when their presidents can 
be stripped of their virtual megaphones by 
digital CEOs. 
Against this backdrop, the revitalization 
of bilateral cyber diplomacy in the form of 
a trade and technology council between the 
EU and the United States has gained special 
attention for transatlantic cooperation since 
Joe Biden’s election as US president. From 
the US perspective, any reconfiguration of a 
European cyber foreign and security policy 
should be based on an alliance of democratic 
multilateralists that must include the United 
States. Europe will only be strong enough 
to defend the functioning of the digital in-
ternal market based on European treaties 
against China and other authoritarian states 
if it cooperates with democracies such as 
Canada, Australia, Japan, the United States, 
and others, even if they only cooperate in 
the short term (ad hoc coalitions). 
The literature already contains concrete 
proposals in this regard, some with far-
reaching consequences. In October 2019, 
Richard A. Clarke and Rob Knake advocated 
the establishment of a US-led “Internet 
Freedom League” that would encompass all 
states committed to a free, open, and demo-
cratic Internet. It should form a digital block 
analogous to the European Schengen Area, 
within which data, services, and products 
could move freely, whereas all those states 
that do not respect freedom of expression 
and the protection of privacy and allow 
cybercrime would be excluded: “The goal 
should be a digital version of the Schengen 
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Agreement.” In this cyber and information 
space, which according to the US view has 
yet to be developed, vulnerable online sys-
tems would be identified, their operators 
informed, and their resilience jointly worked 
on; malware and botnets would be elimi-
nated at an early stage; and cyberattacks 
among the members would be prohibited – 
similar to the coordination of global health 
policy by the World Health Organization. 
Certainly, these goals are broadly consistent 
with, but go beyond, UN standards for re-
sponsible state behavior. Such a tech diplo-
macy alliance should integrate the EU’s 
various cybersecurity programs in the West-
ern Balkans and the six Eastern Partnership 
countries in the EU’s immediate neighbor-




In his influential study on the danger of 
fragmentation of the global Internet, politi-
cal scientist Milton L. Mueller describes 
forcefully that all hopes for a global Inter-
net depended directly on non-state and 
private actors continuing to play an essen-
tial role in its governance. There is no 
guarantee that individual European mem-
ber states will not mimic the Internet 
censorship measures being pursued by 
Russia and China using deep packet in-
spection tools and banning VPNs unless 
they are countered by a strong social and 
legal corrective. This corrective can have 
both a cognitive and a power-political 
effect. In the European Commission, out-
standing expertise has been built up in 
preparation of relevant legal acts on digital 
markets, services, algorithms, and data – 
in contrast to American, Chinese, and Rus-
sian standardization. This knowledge of 
regulations, standards, and norms is in 
high demand by various international play-
ers such as the African Union, the ASEAN 
states, Brazil, Australia, and South Korea. 
Europe’s role as an exporter of standards 
in data protection and data security, en-
cryption, and cybersecurity also has eco-
nomic consequences for players on the 
international market who want to continue 
to operate in the digital single market – 
despite the high requirements, for example, 
for compliance with standard contractual 
clauses for data transfers, which were made 
even more stringent by the restrictive case 
law of the European Court of Justice in July 
2020. The EU’s cyber diplomacy must nego-
tiate the future global standard contractual 
clauses on data transfer as well as a new 
transatlantic Privacy Shield with the United 
States in the Transatlantic Council on Trade 
and Technology. 
EU approaches to the management of 
critical Internet resources also imposed by 
the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets 
Act will in the future envisage even stricter 
targets than before: Dependencies on indi-
vidual suppliers are to be diversified. Audit-
ing by means of an EU-wide IT security 
label is to link market access for all market 
participants to minimum standards and 
certifications. Encryption technologies are 
to ensure high European security standards 
in the future in order to guarantee the integ-
rity and security of data. However, civil 
society and the business community are 
critical of mandatory decryption or master 
keys for law enforcement agencies, as de-
manded by individual governments. 
An important initiative for securing Euro-
pean digital sovereignty is the strengthen-
ing of the European cloud and data infra-
structure project GAIA-X. In order to assert 
themselves against non-European market 
power, leading member states and the Euro-
pean Commission are attempting to bundle 
European companies and leverage their 
own values based on the EU treaties as a 
competitive advantage against third parties. 
Data protection and data security should no 
longer be seen as a hindrance to technologi-
cal development, but as a driver of inno-
vation – especially in light of the fact that 
quantum computing can already circum-
vent common methods of cryptography. 
EU digital sovereignty is complex, but 
that does not mean that everything should 
now be done autonomously via the EU 
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Commission, but rather that a technically 
sophisticated strategic choice should be 
made to control those truly critical com-
ponents. Cyber diplomacy of the EEAS, in 
close consultation with the European Com-
mission, requires an intensive cooperation 
between public and private partnerships if 
it is to be technically competitive. There-
fore, it should strive to promote the devel-
opment of trusted IT through these partner-
ships. Artificial intelligence can be used 
associatively for the early detection of 
attacks on automated systems. Finally, in-
formation about Indicators of Compromise, 
i.e., characteristics and data that indicate a 
system or network is compromised, must 
be made available to all stakeholders so 
that everyone can participate in the solu-
tions offered. 
The cyber diplomacy conducted by EEAS, 
in cooperation with the Commission or the 
Cyber Security Agency, should be enabled 
to raise these technological requirements to 
the level of European infrastructures so that 
industry and the owner of the critical infra-
structures can benefit from the results. Last 
but not least, the Commission intends 
to broaden the scope of what critical infra-
structure should include. In addition to 
traditional sectors such as energy, institu-
tions of national and strategic interest will 
also be targeted. In the future, the Commis-
sion will have an even greater role in ensur-
ing the availability, integrity, and confiden-
tiality of European data through a single 
market external policy. 
Update of Cyber Diplomacy 
Needed 
A world that is growing together needs 
common rules and a binding legal frame-
work so that common markets can develop 
and the security dilemma can be resolved. 
If EU member states turn to a truly EU 
cyber diplomacy that is guided by the maxim 
of “strategic openness” in its institutional, 
democratic, and economic dimensions, they 
can ensure that the post-war era will only 
not become the digital pre-war era. 
Strategic openness is central to maintaining 
the internal market in order to effectively 
counter the siren songs of mercantilist iso-
lationism and territorial sovereignty think-
ing, even in the digital age. The EU’s digital 
self-assertiveness manifests in reducing 
dependencies, promoting the empower-
ment of civil rights, holding platforms 
accountable, and increasing the competi-
tiveness of the European economy. 
With this aspiration in mind, EU cyber 
diplomacy should, first, help citizens retain 
informational self-determination over their 
personal data. Second, cyber diplomacy, in 
the service of the EU’s digital sovereignty, 
is linked to the strategic capacity to act and 
presupposes that the Union can also assert 
its ideas on data protection and security 
internationally. Third, a European “resover-
eignization” in cyber diplomacy in the digi-
tal age means realizing that a minimum de-
gree of dominance or control by the EU over 
the necessary technological resources – 
from Internet nodes to cloud infrastructure 
to international standard-setting – is what 
makes digital sovereignty possible in the 
first place. Fourth, this includes ensuring 
that European laws are applied to cyber-
space and are enforced by European courts. 
China and the United States, for example, 
essentially limit themselves to domestic 
providers for critical infrastructure (hard-
ware and software) for cybersecurity 
reasons. Fifth, in the spirit of reciprocity and 
competitiveness, harmonization of IT 
security legislation and procurement and 
licensing rules at the EU level would be 
logical. Cooperation between the EU and 
democracies such as the United States, 
Canada, Singapore, South Korea, and 
Taiwan could promote this. 
These goals are served by the EU’s new 
and planned legal acts and strategies on 
data, markets, services, and algorithms in 
Europe and, most recently, on cybersecurity. 
As the Union moves forward in this way, 
member states should also be prepared 
to update Europe’s narrative as a force 
for peace in the digital age through more 
robust and coordinated foreign, security, 
and defense policies and by honoring their 
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strategic orientation and institutional 
anchoring in EU cyber diplomacy. This 
would at least be the logical consequence. 
Qualified majority decisions are certainly 
needed to be able to respond with restric-
tive measures in the event of serious cyber-
attacks. 
But harmonization is not always the 
path to optimization. A pan-European and 
pan-societal approach to cybersecurity 
means formalizing the exchange of knowl-
edge between institutions, security author-
ities, academia, and industry. Defense and 
diplomacy in the cyber and information 
space remain sovereign tasks. At least since 
the ruling of the Federal Constitutional 
Court (BVerfG) on the Federal Intelligence 
Service of May 19, 2020, and the BVerfG’s 
non-acceptance decision of December 16, 
2020, it has become clear that the obliga-
tions of all German authorities under the 
rule of law do not end at the state’s external 
borders, and that the state is fundamentally 
liable for violations of fundamental rights 
abroad – this also applies in the CIS. This 
means that close cooperation is required in 
this complex cybersecurity architecture. At 
the same time, it places new demands on 
constitutional principles in Germany, such 
as the separation between defense and 
police powers and the limits to the deploy-
ment of the military within German bor-
ders. Effective and accountable cybersecurity 
policy at the national level creates condi-
tions that enable administrative assistance at 
the EU level and in cooperation with alliance 
partners in a legally secure manner – with 
EU cyber diplomacy as the centerpiece. 
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